WW photo: Terri KayIndigenous people and their supporters gathered in Emeryville, Calif., on Nov. 23 at the site of the Emeryville Shellmound, the oldest and largest shellmound burial site of the Ohlone people. The annual event here is in protest of a shopping mall that has been built on top of the sacred shellmound, destroying and desecrating it. Now the mall owners call it private property and refuse to allow the Ohlone people and their supporters to distribute fliers on the sidewalks of the “private” open-air mall. Security guards called police on community supporters who were asking shoppers to take their business elsewhere.FacebookTwitterWhatsAppEmailPrintMoreShare thisFacebookTwitterWhatsAppEmailPrintMoreShare this
By Gary Truitt – Sep 22, 2017 SHARE Facebook Twitter Previous articleClosing CommentsNext articleTaiwan Trade Team Meets with Indiana Farmers Gary Truitt SHARE Magellan Midstream Partners, the Tulsa, Okla.-based transportation, storage, and distribution company, is now offering blending services for E15—a fuel with 15 percent ethanol—throughout their midcontinent terminal system. Magellan owns the longest refined petroleum product pipeline system in the country.Following reports of this development from our fuel marketing partners, Growth Energy CEO Emily Skor released the following statement:“We applaud Magellan on making E15 available at their terminals. This will allow forward-thinking retailers a more efficient distribution of this fuel into the marketplace by automating the process and generating an E15 bill of lading.“This is a major win for consumer choice and a testament to the momentum behind E15, which is a high-octane, cleaner burning fuel that gives American drivers a more earth-friendly, economical, and engine safe option at the pump.“Now that the infrastructure is prepared for year-round blending of E15, we will continue to push to get Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) relief applied to E15 to finally give American drivers a choice at the pump all year.”Leading retailers including Casey’s, Cenex, Family Express, Kum & Go, Kwik Trip, MAPCO, Minnoco, Murphy USA, Protec Fuel, QuikTrip, RaceTrac, Sheetz, and Thorntons offer E15 currently at more than 900 locations in 29 states.Magellan is offering blending services for E15 on a seasonal basis, which will comply with all laws and regulations. Source: Growth Energy Magellan Midstream Partners Expanding E15 Choice Facebook Twitter Home Energy Magellan Midstream Partners Expanding E15 Choice
News to go further RSF_en This is far from the first time that a government agency has blocked access to Ferghana. An unusually outspoken and critical media outlet in Central Asia, it is already blocked in several countries including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. It was unblocked in Uzbekistan in May. And it was blocked in Kyrgyzstan in 2012 and again in 2017. RussiaEurope – Central Asia Online freedoms InternetFreedom of expression Organisation News December 16, 2019 Ferghana news agency files complaint against site blocking in Russia Two Russian journalists persecuted for investigating police corruption Russian media boss drops the pretence and defends Belarus crackdown News Russia is ranked 149th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2019 World Press Freedom Index, one place lower than in 2018. May 5, 2021 Find out more RussiaEurope – Central Asia Online freedoms InternetFreedom of expression Читать на русском / Read in RussianReporters Without Borders (RSF) supports the complaint that Ferghana, a leading source of Central Asian news coverage, has filed with a Moscow arbitration court challenging the blocking of its website in Russia. The Russian state’s growing control over the Internet is very worrying, RSF says. The complaint filed by the Ferghana news agency on 11 December accuses Roskomnadzor, the federal agency responsible for communications and media control, of failing to respect the procedure for blocking a site. Russian Internet users have been unable to access Ferghana since 10 October, when it was added to the “blacklist” without warning. May 21, 2021 Find out more June 2, 2021 Find out more Listed as a “foreign agent”, Russia’s most popular independent website risks disappearing Help by sharing this information The (confidential) list of websites banned by Roskomnadzor keeps on getting longer. According to the tally kept by RosKomSvoboda, an NGO that combats online censorship, the number of websites that have been blocked without respecting legal procedure now exceeds 510,000. The number of employees at Roskomnadzor has meanwhile grown from 12 in 2012 to more than 2,700 now. Many laws aimed at controlling the Internet and increasing the scope for digital surveillance have been adopted during this period. A law establishing a “sovereign Internet” in Russia took effect on 1 November. News Receive email alerts Follow the news on Russia Related documents russie_2019_12_plainte_ferghana_rus_1.pdfPDF – 90.13 KB “This act of censorship has increased the pressure on independent media outlets even more,” RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk said. “Roskomnadzor’s arbitrary decisions threaten online freedom of expression and trample on the public’s right to news and information, a right guaranteed by the constitution.”
Top StoriesImportant Judgments Of Justice Indu Malhotra Radhika Roy12 March 2021 9:12 AMShare This – x Justice Indu Malhotra, the first woman Judge to be elevated directly from the Bar and the seventh woman Judge to be appointed at the Supreme Court, is set to retire on March 13, 2021. Appointed as a Supreme Court Judge on April 27, 2018, Justice Malhotra also holds the distinction of being the second woman to ever be designated a Senior Advocate by the Supreme Court….Your free access to Live Law has expiredTo read the article, get a premium account.Your Subscription Supports Independent JournalismSubscription starts from ₹ 599+GST (For 6 Months)View PlansPremium account gives you:Unlimited access to Live Law Archives, Weekly/Monthly Digest, Exclusive Notifications, Comments.Reading experience of Ad Free Version, Petition Copies, Judgement/Order Copies.Subscribe NowAlready a subscriber?Login Justice Indu Malhotra, the first woman Judge to be elevated directly from the Bar and the seventh woman Judge to be appointed at the Supreme Court, is set to retire on March 13, 2021. Appointed as a Supreme Court Judge on April 27, 2018, Justice Malhotra also holds the distinction of being the second woman to ever be designated a Senior Advocate by the Supreme Court. Prior to becoming a lawyer, Justice Malhotra completed her LL.B in 1982 from Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, Delhi University, and also taught as a Political Science lecturer at Delhi University. She joined the legal profession in 1983 and, in 1988, secured the first position in the Advocate-on-Record examination. Over the three years as a Supreme Court Judge, Justice Malhotra has delivered a series of remarkable judgements, ranging over varied streams of law – from criminal to commercial. She was also a part of the Constitution Bench which rendered some of the most progressive orders such as decriminalization of homosexuality, and struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional. In the landmark case decriminalizing homosexuality, Justice Malhotra famously observed in her separate judgement that “LGBT persons deserve to live a life unshackled from the shadow of being ‘unapprehended felons’ and that “history owes an apology to the members of this community and their families, for the delay in providing redressal for the ignominy and ostracism that they have suffered through the centuries”. In the Sabarimala case, she dissented from the majority which upheld the right of women of all age groups to enter Lord Ayyappa temple, observing that entertaining PILs in religious matters could damage the secular fabric of the country. She also observed in her dissent that it was beyond the scope of judicial review to “rationalize” religious customs. Justice Malhotra has also authored various landmark judgments pertaining to her specialty – Arbitration Law; she authored the third edition of The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation. From observing that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, and will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the Arbitrator, to cementing that limitation period for filing ‘Section 34’ petition commences from date of receipt of signed copy of arbitral award by the parties, Justice Malhotra has indeed left a footprint in this field. During her tenure, Justice Malhotra was also a member of the panel which had inquired into the sexual harassment allegations against the then CJI Ranjan Gogoi. She was appointed to the panel after Justice NV Ramana had recused on account of objection to his inclusion due to his friendship with the former CJI. This In-House Committee, which also comprised of now CJI SA Bobde and Justice Indira Banerjee, consequently gave a clean chit to the former CJI and stated that the report was not liable to be made public. In this piece, LiveLaw chronologically has listed some of the major judgements/orders rendered by a Bench with Justice Malhotra. 1. Inordinate Delay To Complete Investigation May Be Taken As Presumptive Proof Of Prejudice, Particularly When Accused Is In Custody While disposing of an application by the CBI seeking modification of time limit prescribed in an earlier judgement, a Bench of Justices AK Goel and Indu Malhotra observed that “speedy investigation is recognized as a part of a fundamental right of fair procedure under Article 21 of the Constitution” and that “no investigating agency can take unduly long time in completing the investigation”. The Bench went on to record that there was a clear need for timelines for completing investigation and for having an in-house oversight mechanism wherein accountability for adhering to laid down timelines could be fixed at different levels in the hierarchy. Further, it was held that “inordinate delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice particularly when accused is in custody so that prosecution does not become persecution”. Case Name: Dilawar v. State of Haryana & Anr. Date: 01.05.2018 2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) Will Override Provisions Of Other Enactments Inconsistent With It Upholding a Delhi High Court judgement which held that moratorium under the IBC will apply to the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, a Bench comprising Justices RF Nariman and Indu Malhotra observed that the IBC will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income Tax Act. “Given Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it is obvious that the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-Tax Act”. Case Name: Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. Date: 10.08.2018 3. Oral Evidence In Application To Set Aside Arbitral Award Shouldn’t Be Allowed Unless Absolutely Necessary A Bench of Justices RF Nariman and Indu Malhotra held that an application for setting aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond that record that was before the Arbitrator. The Court did, however, go on to note that if there were matters not contained in such record and were relevant to the determination of issues arising under Section 34(2)(a), they could be brought to notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. “Cross-examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary, as the truth will emerge on a reading of the affidavits filed by both parties”, stated the Court. Further, the Bench took into account that the enactment of the 1996 Act, as well as the subsequent amendments, was for the speedy resolution of arbitral disputes. Therefore, if issues were to be framed and oral evidence was to be taken in a summary proceeding under Section 34, this object would be defeated. Case Name: M/s Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi Date: 20.08.2018 4. Purpose Of Compensation Under MV Act Is To Fully And Adequately Restore the Aggrieved To The Position Prior To The Accident “The Claimant is entitled to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, and enjoy those things and amenities which he would have enjoyed, but for the injuries”, observed a Bench of Justices RF Nariman and Indu Malhotra as they enhanced the compensation awarded to a man by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by almost three times. “In cases of motor accidents leading to injuries and disablements, it is a well-settled principle that a person must not only be compensated for his physical injury, but also for the non-pecuniary losses which he has suffered due to the injury. The Claimant is entitled to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, and enjoy those things and amenities which he would have enjoyed, but for the injuries. The purpose of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is to fully and adequately restore the aggrieved to the position prior to the accident”, stated the judgement authored by Justice Malhotra. Case Name: Anant Son of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratap Son of Zhamnnappa Lamzane and Anr. Date: 21.08.2018 5. History Owes An Apology To LGBT Community; They Deserve To Live A Life Unshackled From the Shadow Of Being “Unapprehended Felons” – Decriminalising Homosexuality In a landmark judgement decriminalizing homosexuality, Justice Indu Malhotra in her separate judgment, observed that the history owes an apology to the members of the LGBTQIA+ community and their families for the delay in providing redressal for the ignominy and ostracism that they had suffered for centuries. “A subjective notion of public or societal morality which discriminates against LGBT persons, and subjects them to criminal sanction, simply on the basis of an innate characteristic runs counter to the concept of Constitutional morality, and cannot form the basis of a legitimate State interest”. Justice Malhotra further held that Section 377 was too open-ended and provided scope for misuse against members of the community, and that by curtailing personal liberty of these persons to engage in voluntary sexual relationships with a partner of their choice, in a safe and dignified environment, was violative of Article 21. Case Name: Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union Of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice Date: 6.09.2018 6. Adulterous Woman Can’t Be Treated As Victim And The Man, A Seducer – Striking Down Of Section 497 IPC As Unconstitutional Striking down the 158 year-old adultery law under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, Justice Indu Malhotra of a the 5-Judge Constitution Bench, recorded that the Section failed to consider both men and women as equally autonomous individuals in society. “A law which deprives women of the right to prosecute, is not gender-neutral. Under Section 497, the wife of the adulterous male, cannot prosecute her husband for marital infidelity. This provision is therefore ex facie discriminatory against women, and violative of Article 14. Section 497 as it stands today, cannot hide in the shadows against the discerning light of Article 14 which irradiates anything which is unreasonable, discriminatory and arbitrary”, remarked Justice Malhotra. Justice Malhotra went on to note that proceeding on the basis in a consensual sexual relationship, an adulterous, who had knowingly and voluntarily entered into a sexual relationship with another married man, was the “victim”, and the male offender was the “seducer”, was unrealistic. “The time when wives were invisible to the law, and lived in the shadows of their husbands, has long since gone by. A legislation that perpetuates such stereotypes in relationships, and institutionalizes discrimination is a clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. There is, therefore, no justification for continuance of Section 497 of IPC as framed in 1860, to remain on the statute book”. Case Name: Joseph Shine v. Union of India Date: 27.09.2018 7. Justice Malhotra Opposes Women Entry In Sabarimala Justice Indu Malhotra, the lone woman in the Constitution Bench which had heard the Sabarimala matter pertaining to entry of women of all age groups in the temple, dissented against the entry while opining that in issues of deep religious sentiments, the Court should ordinarily not interfere. Stating that entertaining PILs challenging religious practices in a pluralistic society could cause serious damage to the Constitutional and secular fabric of the country, Justice Malhotra cautioned, “permitting PILs in religious matters would open the floodgates to interlopers to question religious beliefs and practices, even the Petitioner is not a believer of a particular religion or a worshipper of a particular shrine. The perils are even graver for religious minorities if such petitions are entertained”. She further observed that the Court had the Constitutional duty to harmonise the rights of all persons, religious denominations or sects thereof, to practise their religion according to their beliefs and practices. “Judicial review of religious practices ought not to be undertaken, as the Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity. Doing so would negate the freedom to practice one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs. It would amount to rationalizing religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of Courts”, Justice Malhotra explained. Case Name: Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v. The State of Kerala & Ors Date: 28.09.2018 8. To Attract Rigors Of Sections 7 and 13(2) of PC Act, Twin Requirement of Demand And Acceptance Of Bribe Must Be Proved Letting off a DESU employee who had been booked way back in 1995, a Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra reiterated that to prove the offence of any public servant demanding and accepting illegal gratification, one had to necessarily prove the “twin requirement of demand and acceptance of the bribe amount”. “Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the prosecution was under a legal obligation to prove the twin requirements of demand and acceptance of bribe money by the accused, the proving of one alone but not the other was not sufficient. The Appellant is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges framed against him under the PC Act too”, read the Judgement. Case Name: Dashrath Singh Chauhan v. Central Bureau of Investigation Date: 09.10.2018 9. Factors To Be Considered By Arbitrator While Awarding Interest Observing that the discretion of the Arbitrator must be exercised reasonably, a Bench of Justices RF Nariman and Indu Malhotra listed out the factors that must taken into consideration by the Arbitrator while awarding interest. It was further held by the Bench that the award-debtor could not be subjected to a penal rate of interest, either during the period when he is entitled to exercise the statutory right to challenge the award, before a Court or later. “On the one hand, the rate of interest must be compensatory as it is a form of reparation granted to the award-holder, while on the other hand, it must not be punitive, unconscionable or usurious in nature”, observed the Court. Case Name: Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. Date: 11.10.2018 10. Home Buyer Ought Not To Be Allowed To Reap Benefits Of Their Own Delay In Taking Possession While hearing appeals filed under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra asserted that “purchaser ought not to be allowed to reap benefits of her own delay in taking possession”. Upholding the compensation to a disgruntled home-buyer, the Bench reduced the time period for computation of the amount, but noted the delay on the part of the buyer in taking possession. Case Name: M/s Supertech Ltd. v. Rajni Goyal Date: 23.10.2018 11. Supreme Court Issues Directions On Examination Of Witnesses In Criminal Trial Setting aside a Kerala High Court order, a Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra observed that while deciding an Application to defer cross-examination under Section 231(20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a balance had to be struct between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. Accordingly, the Justice Malhotra-authored judgement listed out “practical guidelines” to be followed by the Trial Courts in the conduct of a criminal trial “as far as possible”. They also stipulated the factors that had to be considered while deciding an Application under Section 231(2) such as possibility of undue influence or threats to witnesses. Case Name: State of Kerala v. Rasheed Date: 30.10.2018 12. Article 226 Can’t Be Used For Deciding Disputes For Which Civil And Criminal Remedies Are Available “The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where the violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged”, observed the Bench comprising Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra. The Court, while hearing an appeal against a Kerala High Court order which had allowed a writ petition filed by a person, who was forcefully dispossessed by the police, seeking restoration of possession, observed that a regular suit would be the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between private persons. “In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. The Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant”, held the Court. Case Name: Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez KT & Ors Date: 03.12.2018 13. Retrenchment Procedure Under Section 25F ID Act Not Applicable To Employee Who Abandons Work A Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra held that an employee who voluntarily abandons work cannot be treated as on in “continuous service” of the employer as per Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, procedure for retrenchment as per under Section 25F of the ID Act will not apply to such an employee. The judgment stated, “Once it is established that the Appellant had voluntarily abandoned her service, she could not have been in ‘continuous service’ as defined under Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, 1947. Section 25F of the ID Act, 1947 lays down the conditions that are required to be fulfilled by an employer, while terminating the services of an employee, who has been in ‘continuous service’ of the employer. Hence, Section 25F of ID Act, would cease to apply on her”. Case Name: Manju Saxena v. Union of India Date: 03.12.2018 14. SC Explains Five Material Questions To Be Answered In Specific Performance Suit Reiterating that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief, the Bench comprising Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre and Justice Indu Malhotra listed out the requirements to be answered in a specific performance suit: 1. Whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property? 2. Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract? 3. Whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract? 4. Whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds? Case Name: Kamal Kumar v. Premalata Joshi & Ors. Date: 07.01.2019 15. Deceased’s Parents Are Most Natural Witnesses In Dowry Death Cases Relying on the evidence of the deceased wife’s parents and relatives, Supreme Court Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra upheld the conviction of a man accused of dowry death. “There is no reason to discard the evidence of the father and mother of the deceased who are the most natural and material witnesses to speak on such issues. Indeed, in such circumstances, the daughter – a newly married girl would always like to first disclose her domestic problems to her mother and father and then to her close relatives because they have access to her and are always helpful in solving her problems. Why should a mother and a father lie unless there are justifiable reasons behind it”. Case Name: Mahadevappa v. State of Karnataka Rep. By Public Prosecutor Date: 07.01.2019 16. Property Inherited By A Male Will Remain As Coparcenary Property For Descendants Upto Three Degrees Below Him A Bench of Justices UU Lalit and Indu Malhotra held that the rule under Mitakshara law that whenever a male ancestor inherits any property from any of his paternal ancestors upto three degrees above him, then his male heirs upto three degrees below him would get an equal right as coparceners in that property. “If succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e. prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the parties would be governed by Mitakshara law. The property inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal male ancestor shall be coparcenary property in his hands vis-à-vis his male descendants upto three degrees below him. The nature of property will remain as coparcenary property even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956”, observed the judgment authored by Justice Malhotra. Case Name: Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur & Ors Date: 01.07.2019 16. Bail Cannot Be Granted Without Assigning Reasons A Bench of Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra, while setting aside an Allahabad High Court order that granted bail in a murder case, reiterated that bail could not be granted without assigning any proper reason as to on what grounds, even though of a prime facie nature, it is considered just and proper to grant bail. The Court observed, “Though it may not be necessary to give categorical finding while granting or rejecting the bail for want of full evidence adduced by the prosecution as also by the defence at that stage yet it must appear from a perusal of the order that the Court has applied its mind to the relevant facts in the light of the material filed by the prosecution at the time of consideration of the bail application”. Case Name: Mauji Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. Date: 29.07.2019 17. Right of Minority Educational Institutions Are Absolute; Are Amenable To Regulations While turning down the plea challenging certain G.O.Ms. issued by the Governmetn of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court Bench of Justices Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna observed that the right of minority institutions was absolute, and was amenable to regulation, and that the protection granted to Minority Educational Institutions to admit students of their choice was subject to reasonable restrictions. Case Name: Andhra Kesari College of Education & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Date: 25.09.2019 18. Road Traffic Offences Can Be Prosecuted Under Both IPC and Motor Vehicles Act A Bench of Justices Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna observed that road traffic offences can be prosecuted under Motor Vehicles Act as well as Indian Penal Code, and set aside the direction issued by the Gauhati High Court to States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under the provisions of MV Act and not IPC. It was observed that there was no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the MV Act, and that they operated in separate spheres. Therefore, the principle that the special law should prevail over general law had no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the IPC and MV Act. Further, there was no provision under the MV Act which separately dealt with offences causing death, or grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle, while there were Sections in the IPC which had been specifically framed to deal with such offences. Additionally, offences under the MV Act were compoundable and would lead to an offender getting away with a fine by pleading guilty, without having to face any prosecution for the offence committed. Case Name: State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas @ Ratan Rabidas & Anr. Date: 04.10.2019 19. Non-Compliance of Section 50 Of NDPS Act During ‘Personal Search’ Cannot Invalidate Recovery From Vehicle Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra and Krishna Murari observed that merely because there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act as far as ‘personal search’ of the accused was concerned, no benefit could be extended so as to invalidate the effect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Therefore, the mandate of Section 50 was confined to ‘personal search’ and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises. Case Name: State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh & Anr. Date: 15.10.2019 20. Rape Case Can’t Be Quashed When Victim Has A Case That ‘Settlement’ Was Made Under Threat & Coercion Supreme Court set aside a High Court order which had quashed a rape case by recording ‘settlement’ between the accused and the victim and observed that, “From the perusal of the order of the High Court, it is evident that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual. When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such document itself is obtained under threat and coercion, it is a matter to be investigated”. The Bench comprising of Justices UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy then referred to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act and noted that if a woman in her evidence before the Court stated that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent Case Name: Miss XYZ v. State of Gujarat Date: 25.10.2019 21. Mere Irregularity In Sanction Will Not Vitiate Conviction In Corruption Cases Upholding the conviction of an accused under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a Bench of Justices Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna observed that a mere error, omission or irregularity in corruption case should not be considered fatal unless it has resulted in a failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. “A mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in a failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) of the Act is matter of procedure and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction and once the cognizance has been taken by the court under the Code, it cannot be said that an invalid police report is the foundation of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance and for that matter the trial.” Case Name: Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (GNCTD) Date: 27.11.2019 22. No Protection Of Sanction Where The Acts Are Performed Using The Public Office As A Mere Cloak For Unlawful Gains The Supreme Court observed that protection of sanction to public servants under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not available where the acts are performed using the office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains. Further, the protection of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act would not be available to a public servant after he had demitted his office or retired from service. The Bench of Justices UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra and Krishna Murari disapproved the observation of the High Court (which had allowed the discharge plea of the accused) that the protection available to a public servant while in service should also be available after his retirement. Regarding the protection under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Bench said that it is available to the public servants when an offence is said to have been committed ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty’, but where the acts are performed using the office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains, such acts are not protected. The issue whether the alleged act is intricately connected with the discharge of official functions and whether the matter would come within the expression ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty’, would get crystalized only after evidence is led and the issue of sanction can be agitated at a later stage as well, it added. Case Name: SHO, CBI/ACB/Bangalore v. BA Srinivasan & Anr. Date: 05.12.2019 23. Hospital Vicariously Liable For Medical Negligence Committed By Its Doctors Supreme Court Bench of Justices UU Lalit and Indu Malhotra upheld an NCDRC order and observed that a hospital is vicariously liable for the acts of negligence committed by the doctors engaged or empaneled to provide medical care. Referring to Bolam Test and other judgments on medical negligence, the Court observed that the reasonable standard of care for a premature baby mandates screening and checking up for ROP. Further, it held, “A medical professional should be alert to the hazards and risks in any professional task he undertakes to the extent that other ordinarily competent members of the profession would be alert. He must bring to any professional task he undertakes reasonable skill that other ordinarily competent members of his profession would bring”. Case Name: Maharaja Agrasen Hospital & Ors v. Master Rishabh Sharma and Ors. Date: 16.12.2019 24. Right To Property Is A Constitutional As Well As A Human Right A Bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, while allowing an appeal filed by the Hari Krishna Mandir Trust in the matter of a land dispute with the Pune Municipal Corporation, observed that the right to property is still a constitutional right and a human right. It was held that the right to property includes any proprietary/hereditary interest in the right of management of a religion endowment, as well as anything acquired by inheritance. “The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A and a human right as observed by this Court in Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Others. In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The Appellant trust cannot be deprived of its property save in accordance with law.” Case Name: Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra & Ors Date: 07.08.2020 25. Time Of Publication Of E-Gazette Is Significant For Determining The Enforceability Of Notifications The Supreme Court observed that the precise time when the gazette is published in the electronic mode is significant for determining the enforceability of notifications. A Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and KM Joseph thus upheld a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgement which had allowed writ petitions filed by various importers. Referring to various judgments, General Clauses Act and Information Technology Act, Justice DY Chandrachud, on behalf of himself and Justice Malhotra, observed, “With the change in the manner of publishing gazette notifications from analog to digital, the precise time when the gazette is published in the electronic mode assumes significance. Notification 5/2019, which is akin to the exercise of delegated legislative power, under the emergency power to notify and revise tariff duty under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, cannot operate retrospectively, unless authorized by statute. In the era of the electronic publication of gazette notifications and electronic filing of bills of entry, the revised rate of import duty under the Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented for home consumption after the notification was uploaded in the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019.” Case Name: Union of India & Ors v. M/s GS Chatha Rice Mills & Anr. Date: 23.09.2020 26. In Transnational Child Custody Cases, ‘Mirror Orders’ From Foreign Courts Ensure Welfare Of Minor A Bench of Justices UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra and Hemant Gupta (in 2:1 majority) applied the concept of a ‘mirror order’ in case involving transnational custody and, held that the father was entitled to the permanent custody of the child and thus allowed him to shift his son to Kenya. The judgement authored by Justice Malhotra explained the objective of a mirror order as an order to safeguard the interest of a minor child in transit from one jurisdiction to another, and to ensure that both parents are equally bound in each State. “The mirror order is passed to ensure that the courts of the country where the child is being shifted are aware of the arrangements which were made in the country where he had ordinarily been residing. Such an order would also safeguard the interest of the parent who is losing custody, so that the rights of visitation and temporary custody are not impaired.” The Supreme Court explained that a ‘mirror order’ is ancillary or auxiliary in character, and supportive of the order passed by the court which has exercised primary jurisdiction over the custody of the child. The judgment of the Court which had exercised primary jurisdiction of the custody of the minor child is however not a matter of binding obligation to be followed by the court where the child is being transferred, which has passed the mirror order. The judgment of the Court exercising primary jurisdiction would however have great persuasive value, explained the judgment. Case Name: Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra Date: 28.10.2020 27. Supreme Court Issues Guidelines On Payment Of Maintenance In Matrimonial Matters In a significant, judgment, the Supreme Court has issued guidelines on payment of maintenance in matrimonial matters. The Bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy held that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance “For enforcement / execution of orders of maintenance, it is directed that an order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Section 20(6) of the D.V. Act; and Section 128 of Cr.P.C., as may be applicable. The order of maintenance may be enforced as a money decree of a civil court as per the provisions of the CPC, more particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 r.w. Order XXI”, the Court held. The Bench also observed that the enforcement of the order of maintenance is the most challenging issue, which is encountered by the applicants. ‘If maintenance is not paid in a timely manner, it defeats the very object of the social welfare legislation. Execution petitions usually remain pending for months, if not years, which completely nullifies the object of the law.”, it said. The judgement further noted that the objective of granting interim/permanent alimony/maintenance is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. Case Name: Rajnesh v. Neha Date: 04.11.2020 28. Summary Eviction Procedure Under Senior Citizens Act Cannot Be Invoked To Defeat Right Of Residence Of Woman In A Shared Household As Per DV Act The Supreme Court held that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act has no overriding effect over the right of residence of a woman in a shared household within the meaning of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act, the Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee observed. The Court also noted the Legislative scheme of both the legislations and said, “The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute. It is necessary to recapitulate that the situation in the present case is that the eviction was sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. ” Case Name: S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District Date: 15.12.2020 29. No Complete Bar On Anticipatory Bail For Triple Talaq Offence, Provided Court Hears Complainant Woman The Supreme Court held that there was no bar on granting anticipatory bail for an offence committed under the Muslim (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, provided that the competent Court must hear the married Muslim woman who has made the complainant before granting anticipatory bail. The Bench comprising of Justices DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee held that it would be at the discretion of the Court to grant ad-interim relief to the accused during the pendency of the anticipatory bail application, having issued notice to the married Muslim woman. It was further observed that the relatives of a “husband” cannot be accused of an offence under the Act. “On a preliminary analysis, it is clear that the Appellant as the mother-in-law of the second respondent cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq under the Act as the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man”. Case Name: Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala & Anr Date: 30.12.2020 30. Incorporation of One-Sided And Unreasonable Clauses In Apartment Buyer’s Agreement Constitutes An ‘Unfair Trade Practice’ Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee has held that the incorporation of one-sided and unreasonable clauses in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act. It was further observed that the Developer cannot compel the apartment buyers to be bound by the one-sided contractual terms contained in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement. This was held while disposing an appeal filed by a Developer against an order passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission directing it to refund of the amounts deposited by the Apartment Buyers on account of the inordinate delay in completing the construction and obtaining the Occupation Certificate. The Bench also referred to clauses of the agreement and observed that the same reflect the wholly one-sided terms of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement, which are entirely loaded in favour of the Developer, and against the allottee at every step. The court said that the terms of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement are oppressive and wholly one-sided, and would constitute an unfair trade practice under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. “We are of the view that the incorporation of such one-sided and unreasonable clauses in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act. Even under the 1986 Act, the powers of the consumer fora were in no manner constrained to declare a contractual term as unfair or one-sided as an incident of the power to discontinue unfair or restrictive trade practices. An “unfair contract” has been defined under the 2019 Act, and powers have been conferred on the State Consumer Fora and the National Commission to declare contractual terms which are unfair, as null and void. This is a statutory recognition of a power which was implicit under the 1986 Act. In view of the above, we hold that the Developer cannot compel the apartment buyers to be bound by the one-sided contractual terms contained in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement.” Case Name: Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v Abhishek Khanna Date: 11.01.2021 31. Basic Philosophy Behind Granting Power To Review Judgments Is “Universal Acceptance Of Human Fallibility” The basic philosophy inherent in granting the power to the Supreme Court to review its judgment under Article 137 is the universal acceptance of human fallibility, the Supreme Court observed in an order allowing a Review Petition. The bench comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan and Indu Malhotra observed that the rejection of Miscellaneous Application seeking recall of a judgment does not preclude filing of a review petition subsequently. In this case, the Supreme Court had earlier allowed a Transfer Petition transferring Trial of a Criminal Case from Metropolitan Magistrate Court at New Delhi to Metropolitan Magistrate at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh. Later, the person who had filed the FIR, approached the Court by filing a Miscellaneous Application praying for recall of the Order which was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed the Review Petition. “The rectification of an order emanates from the fundamental principles that justice is above all. In the Constitution, substantive power to rectify or review the order by the Supreme Court has been specifically provided under Article 137 as noted above. The basic philosophy inherent in granting the power to the Supreme Court to review its judgment under Article 137 is the universal acceptance of human fallibility.” Case Name: Rajendra Khare v. Swaati Nirkhi & Ors. Date: 28.01.2021 32. Collusive Commercial Transactions With Corporate Debtor Will Not Constitute ‘Financial Debt’ Under IBC The Supreme Court held that collusive or sham transactions with corporate debtor will not amount to ‘financial debt’ within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The judgment of the Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee stated, “The IBC recognizes that for the success of an insolvency regime, the real nature of the transactions has to be unearthed in order to prevent any person from taking undue benefit of its provisions to the detriment of the rights of legitimate creditors”. The Court also discussed collusive transactions and observed, “”A transaction which is sham or collusive would only create an illusion that money has been disbursed to a borrower with the object of receiving consideration in the form of time value of money, when in fact the parties have entered into the transaction with a different or an ulterior motive. In other words, the real agreement between the parties is something other than advancing a financial debt”. Case Name: Pheonix Arc Private Limited v. Spade Financial Services Limited Date: 01.02.2021 33. Pass Reasoned Judgment Along With Operative Order; Supreme Court Directs NCDRC The Supreme Court, criticizing the practice of ‘reasons to follow’ orders, directed the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to pass reasoned Judgment along with the operative order. Bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi observed that, in all matters before NCDRC where reasons are yet to be delivered, it must be ensured that the same are made available to the litigating parties positively within a period of two months. “Undisputedly, the rights of the aggrieved parties are being prejudiced if the reasons are not available to them to avail of the legal remedy of approaching the Court where the reasons can be scrutinized. It indeed amounts to defeating the rights of the party aggrieved to challenge the impugned judgment on merits and even the succeeding party is unable to obtain the fruits of success of the litigation”, the Bench observed while noticing that, in the instant case, the operative order was pronounced on 26.04.2019, and in the reasoned judgment was made available after eight months. Case Name: Sudipta Chakrobarty v. Ranaghat SD Hospital & Ors. Date: 15.02.2021 34. Giving Extra Chance For A Few In UPSC Exams Will Have A Cascading Effect On Other Examinations While dismissing a writ petition seeking for an additional chance for Civil Services candidates who had exhausted their last attempt in October 2020 at giving the UPSC examination, a Bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi observed that solely providing relaxation to candidates who are not age-barred was discriminatory. Further, the complaint of the Petitioners’ could not be taken in isolation and “the data furnished to this Court by the Commission clearly indicate that various selections have been held by the Commission for the Central Services…, if this Court shows indulgence to few who had participated in the Examination 2020, it well set down a precedent and also have a cascading effect on examinations in other streams, for which we are dissuaded to exercise plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.” Case Name: Rachna v. Union of India Date: 24.02.2021 35. OBC Reservation Cannot Exceed 50% The Supreme Court read down Section 12(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, which provides reservation of 27% of seats in the Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis. “Reservation in favour of OBCs in the concerned local bodies can be notified to the extend that it does not exceed aggregate 50% of the total seats reserved in favour of SCs/STs/OBCs taken together”, the Bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi observed. The Court observed that the rigid interpretation of the provision would be violative of the dictum laid down by the Constitution bench in K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) & Ors. v. Union of India 2010) 7 SCC 202 that the State legislations providing for reservation of seats in respect of OBCs, it must ensure that in no case the aggregate vertical reservation in respect of SCs/STs/OBCs taken together should exceed 50 per cent of the seats in the concerned local bodies. “The provision in the form of Section 12(2)(c) can be saved by reading it down, to mean that reservation in favour of OBCs in the concerned local bodies may be notified to the extent, that it does not exceed 50 per cent of the total seats reserved in favour of SCs/STs/OBCs taken together. In other words, the expression “shall be” preceding 27 per cent occurring in Section 12(2)(c), be construed as “may be” including to mean that reservation for OBCs may be up to 27 per cent but subject to the outer limit of 50 per cent aggregate in favour of SCs/STs/OBCs taken together, as enunciated by the Constitution Bench of this Court. On such interpretation, Section 12(2)(c) can be saved and at the same time, the law declared by the Constitution Bench of this Court can be effectuated in its letter and spirit.”, the Bench said. The Judgment was rendered while disposing writ petitions which sought a declaration that Section 12(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act is ultra vires the provisions of Articles 243D and 243T including Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions had also challenged the validity of the notifications issued by the State Election Commission, Maharashtra providing for reservation exceeding 50 per cent in respect of Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis of districts Washim, Akola, Nagpur and Bhandara. Case Name: Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra Date: 04.03.2021 36. Limitation Period For Filing ‘Section 34’ Petition Commences From Date Of Receipt Of Signed Copy Of Arbitral Award By Parties: Supreme CourtThe period of limitation for filing the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would commence from the date on which the signed copy of the award was made available to the parties, a judgment authored by Justice Malhotra held.The bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi observed that there can be no finality of the award, except after it is signed.Case: Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs. M/S Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd.37. Limitation Period For Filing ‘Section 11′ Application Seeking Appointment Of Arbitrator Governed By Article 137 Limitation ActThe period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, and will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the arbitrator, the Supreme Court held.In rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time barred, and it is manifest that there is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference, the bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi held. The court also suggested amendment of Section 11 of the Act to provide a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is in consonance with the object of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings.Case : Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd38. Period of execution for foreign award is 12 yearsIn Government of India v Vedanta Ltd & Ors., a judgment authored by Justice Malhotra held that the limitation period for enforcing foreign awards was deemed to be 12 years, both following the Limitation Act. In both judgments39. State Cannot Be Permitted To Perfect Title By Adverse Possession To Grab Property Of Its Own Citizens A bench of Justices Indu Malhotra and Justices Ajay Rastogi held that state cannot invoke the doctrine of adverse possession to perfect title over land grabbed from private citizens. The judgment authored by Justice Malhotra held that that forcible dispossession of a person from his private property is violative of human right and constitutional right under Article 300A.Case : Vidya Devi vs The State of Himachal Pradesh and others40. Teachers Are Entitled To Gratuity, Holds SC After Recalling Erroneous JudgmentIn this case, a bench comprising Justices AM Sapre and Indu Malhotra, recalled an earlier judgment after noticing an error, and held that teachers are also entitled to gravity under the Payment of Gratutity Act.Case : Birla Institute of Technology v State of Jharkhand.https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/state-cannot-be-permitted-to-perfect-title-by-adverse-possession-to-grab-property-of-its-own-citizens-sc-151423 Also Read :’Society Benefits When Gender Diversity Is Found On Bench’ : Justice Indu Malhotra In Farewell Speech’All Direct Appointees To SC Had A Very Interesting Career’ : Justice Nariman During Justice Indu Malhotra’s FarewellJustice Indu Malhotra: The Breaker Of Glass Ceilings Our Very Own Indu Ma’am Next Story
Pinterest Facebook By News Highland – February 17, 2020 Arranmore progress and potential flagged as population grows FG preparing for opposition – Varadkar Twitter RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR Facebook Previous articleCross border trade reaches all-time highNext articleMissing Derry man may be in Donegal area News Highland Nine til Noon Show – Listen back to Monday’s Programme WhatsApp Loganair’s new Derry – Liverpool air service takes off from CODA News, Sport and Obituaries on Monday May 24th Pinterest Twitter Google+ Homepage BannerNews DL Debate – 24/05/21 Important message for people attending LUH’s INR clinic Google+ An Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said his party is preparing for opposition – and that it will only enter government as a last resort.Fine Gael’s Parliamentary Party will meet for the first time since the election to decide what its next steps should be.Mr. Varadkar says that Sinn Féin should try to put together a left wing government, and that Fianna Fáil should try to form a rainbow coalition with the Greens, Labour, the Social Democrats and Independents.It means he has not ruled out the much rumoured grand coalition between Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, but that it’s not his first option. WhatsApp
• Lakeside Toyota has backed off its statement that a senior executivethreatened to fire a director if he hired any more black employees. The companychanged its position after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in theUS added five more names to a federal lawsuit alleging a white supervisorstruck black salesmen with sticks and used racial slurs to address them. Thesuit now alleges all five black salesman, as well as original complainant EddieBoyd, were forced to leave after complaining about abuse by a white used carmanager. The person to whom they complained, used car director David Oseng,reported the matter but was told he needed “an attitude change” andwas eventually fired, the EEOC says. In an earlier court filing, Lakeside Toyotaadmitted a senior manager told Oseng not to hire any more black people or hewould be fired. In the new filing, the company says Oseng was told not to hireany more “unqualified” black people.www.shrm.org/hrnews/Large organisations top diversity league in US• Thirty-eight per cent of US employers have a formal diversity programme,according to a survey by William Mercer. Large organisations (5,000-plus staffare almost three times as likely as mid-sized organisations (fewer than 5,000staff) to have diversity programmes. Two-thirds of the large employers haveformal programmes, compared to only 24 per cent of mid-sized organisations.Such programmes are more common among services companies (41 per cent) thanmanufacturers (28 per cent).www.wmmercer.com/usa/english/service/a&r/index.htmlEU to widen competition in postal services• The European Commission has drawn up controversial plans for opening upthe E80bn ($75.5bn) EU mail market to further competition. It is expected toadopt the proposals on 24 May to liberalise 27 per cent of existing postalmonopoly services by 2003. The proposals are highly sensitive as many nationalpostal services and governments, including France, are strongly opposed to moreliberalisation. The debate about postal competition has become highlypoliticised with warnings of the threat to rural post offices. Ft.com Previous Article Next Article Related posts:No related photos. International news: car giant backs down from race statementOn 16 May 2000 in Personnel Today Comments are closed.
HSC prioritises transport safetyOn 1 Mar 2002 in Personnel Today Safe workplace transport is not just good for the health of workers, thereis also a strong economic case to be madeNearly 100 people were killed in accidents involving workplace transportlast year and thousands injured, the Health and Safety Commission has said. Provisional figures for 2000/01 showed that 99 people were killed in suchaccidents, 2,490 sustained major injuries and a further 5,857 were injuredseriously enough to be off work for more than three days. The most common types of accident were being struck by, or falling from, avehicle, vehicles overturning and materials falling from vehicles. The figures were part of a discussion document unveiled at an HSC conferencein January on how workplace transport safety can be improved. Workplace transport is one of the eight priority areas identified by the HSCbecause of its high accident rate. The discussion document, Preventing workplace transport accidents, will bein consultation until May. It looks at areas such as managing and assessing risk, introducing andenforcing control measures, better communication between drivers andcontrollers, better maintenance of vehicles and keeping pedestrians segregatedfrom vehicles. Bill Callaghan, Health and Safety Commission chairman, said: “The fatalaccident rate is now less than a quarter of what it was in the early 70s – buttoday it is hard to see any significant new ground being won. “We need to change that – the economic case for action is as strong asever and there are social and moral arguments.” In a separate move, the Health and Safety Executive has published a researchreport on improving safety around workplace vehicles. The study, Improving the safety of workers in the vicinity of mobile plant,looks at approaches and technologies to improve the safety of pedestriansaround mobile plant workplaces where there is confined space or restrictedlighting. Comments are closed. Previous Article Next Article Related posts:No related photos.
Oxford had a mixed day at the Henley Boat Races, which take place the day before the Men’s Boat Race. The Dark Blues won every race except for the eagerly anticipated Women’s Blue boat race. Oxford’s Women lost out to a powerful Cambridge crew by two and a third lengths, but there were victories for Men and Women’s Lightweight Blues as well as Osiris, the Women’s reserve crew, and Nepthys, the Lightweight Men’s reserves.The Women Blues followed a risky strategy which reflected their status as underdogs. Having finished well below Cambridge at the Women’s Head race three weeks previously, Oxford clearly felt they had to rattle Cambridge in the early stages of the contest to win. They blasted off the start rating three strokes per minute higher than the Tabs through the first kilometre of the course to inch into a length lead.The Cambridge crew, however, kept their composure. Rowing a much more efficient rhythm, they stayed in touch while Oxford charged and exhausted energy. As the race reached halfway, Cambridge pushed hard, cancelling out Oxford’s advantage, before powering into the lead. Oxford had already given too much to respond, and were left clinging on desperately as the Light Blue boat gradually extended their lead to the finish.President Nicola Fawcett was proud of her team, saying, “the girls rowed everything well. They front-loaded the race to put Cambridge under pressure, but Cambridge’s faster cruising speed paid off”. Fawcett’s disappointment was partly tempered by Osiris’ victory, where Oxford battled to a small lead in the first 1000m before stretching out to a one length win.The Lightweight races, however, belonged to Oxford. The Lightweight Blues crushed Cambridge by three lengths, while Nepthys was even more dominant, winning by four lengths. President James Gillies commented, “Our squad has been awesome, our coaching excellent and I think the results reflect this.” The Women Lightweights provided the race of the day, protecting a tiny lead against successive Cambridge pushes. Blades clashed all the way down the course as both coxes attempted to eek out a winning advantage and the race was still tight in the closing stages until the Dark Blues pushed on to win by a single length. President Claire Weldon was “delighted and relieved to win such a close race”.ARCHIVE: 0th week TT 2005
PAUL RYAN’S PROPOSED BUDGET CUTSFOOTNOTES: A List of Republican Budget Cuts Notice S.S. and the military are NOT on this list . These are all the programs that the new Republican House has proposed cutting. Read to the end.* Corporation for Public Broadcasting Subsidy — $445 million annual savings.* Save America ‘s Treasures Program — $25 million annual savings.* International Fund for Ireland — $17 million annual savings.* Legal Services Corporation — $420 million annual savings.* National Endowment for the Arts — $167.5 million annual savings.* National Endowment for the Humanities — $167.5 million annual savings.* Hope VI Program — $250 million annual savings.* Amtrak Subsidies — $1.565 billion annual savings.* Eliminate duplicating education programs — H.R. 2274 (in last Congress), authored by Rep. McKeon , eliminates 68 at a savings of $1.3 billion annually.* U..S. Trade Development Agency — $55 million annual savings.* Woodrow Wilson Center Subsidy — $20 million annual savings.* Cut in half funding for congressional printing and binding — $47 million annual savings.* John C. Stennis Center Subsidy — $430,000 annual savings.* Community Development Fund — $4.5 billion annual savings.* Heritage Area Grants and Statutory Aid — $24 million annual savings.* Cut Federal Travel Budget in Half — $7.5 billion annual savings* Trim Federal Vehicle Budget by 20% — $600 million annual savings.* Essential Air Service — $150 million annual savings.* Technology Innovation Program — $70 million annual savings.*Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) Program — $125 million annual savings..* Department of Energy Grants to States for Weatherization — $530 million annual savings.* Beach Replenishment — $95 million annual savings.* New Starts Transit — $2 billion annual savings.* Exchange Programs for Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and Their Historical Trading Partners in Massachusetts — $9 million annual savings* Intercity and High Speed Rail Grants — $2.5 billion annual savings.* Title X Family Planning — $318 million annual savings.* Appalachian Regional Commission — $76 million annual savings.* Economic Development Administration — $293 million annual savings.* Programs under the National and Community Services Act — $1.15 billion annual savings.* Applied Research at Department of Energy — $1.27 billion annual savings..* Freedom CAR and Fuel Partnership — $200 million annual savings..* Energy Star Program — $52 million annual savings.*Economic Assistance to Egypt — $250 million annually.* U.S.Agency for International Development — $1.39 billion annual savings..* General Assistance to District of Columbia — $210 million annual savings.* Subsidy for Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority — $150 million annual savings.*Presidential Campaign Fund — $775 million savings over ten years..* No funding for federal office space acquisition — $864 million annual savings.* End prohibitions on competitive sourcing of government services.* Repeal the Davis-Bacon Act — More than $1 billion annually.* IRS Direct Deposit: Require the IRS to deposit fees for some services it offers (such as processing payment plans for taxpayers) to the Treasury, instead of allowing it to remain as part of its budget — $1.8 billion savings over ten years.*Require collection of unpaid taxes by federal employees — $1 billion total savings. WHAT’S THIS ABOUT?* Prohibit taxpayer funded union activities by federal employees — $1.2 billion savings over ten years.* Sell excess federal properties the government does not make use of — $15 billion total savings.*Eliminate death gratuity for Members of Congress. WHAT???* Eliminate Mohair Subsidies — $1 million annual savings.*Eliminate taxpayer subsidies to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change — $12.5 million annual savings. WELL ISN’T THAT SPECIAL* Eliminate Market Access Program — $200 million annual savings.* USDA Sugar Program — $14 million annual savings.* Subsidy to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) — $93 million annual savings.* Eliminate the National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program — $56.2 million annual savings.*Eliminate fund for Obamacare administrative costs — $900 million savings.* Ready to Learn TV Program — $27 million savings..* HUD Ph.D. Program.* Deficit Reduction Check-Off Act.*TOTAL SAVINGS: $2.5 Trillion over Ten YearsADDITIONAL FOOTNOTE: My question is, what is all this doing in the budget in the first placeFacebookTwitterCopy LinkEmail
Parks And Recreation Smoking Ban Deserves Further DiscussionThe City-County Observer believes the partial smoking ban recently passed by the board of the Dept. of Parks and Recreation deserves further discussion. The smoking ban includes both traditional cigarettes and electronic cigarettes, and covers all of the department’s facilities EXCEPT the golf courses, including the Par 3 courses at Howell and Wesselman parks. Also excluded from the ban are the Mesker Park Zoo and Botanical Gardens and the parks attached to those facilities. The ban does cover local neighborhood parks. We see this as problematic in several ways.We wonder what reasoning is behind the ban’s exclusion of the largest and busiest segment of our local parks. Is it meant to give a “pass”to the smokers who are literally “paying to play?” If so, we don’t believe such an elitist policy is in the public interest. If it is a safety issue, the Parks Board has missed the mark. In dry weather, a carelessly tossed cigarette butt could do severe damage to a golf course, wooded area of the parks or cause a terrible loss at the zoo, including the lives of the animals and/or the high-end displays.A smoking ban with no exceptions makes better sense to us than the one that was passed, but does anyone believe that this ordinance could be enforced properly? We don’t believe that it is possible to enforce the policy at all. There are no park rangers, and EPD already seems to have its hands full keeping law and order throughout the city without hunting down smoking ban violators.We really wonder how the board members envisioned this working out. For us, it brings to mind the famous episode of The Andy Griffith show when Gomer Pyle decided to be enforce Mayberry traffic laws on his own by making some “Citizen’s Arrests.” We can find no viable way to accomplish any semblance of enforcement.Smoking bans are very fashionable these days, but we believe the decision to do so selectively is without merit. Promotion of healthy activities is one of the basic purposes of Parks and Recreation department’s mission, so a blanket ban would be understandable, although it would still prove unenforceable.We think this is a “feel good” law that no one will feel good about if they stop and think about it. We hope the Parks Board will reconsidered their action.FOOTNOTE: we wonder why member of the Parks Board are paid an extremely generous annual stipend for serving on this politically appointed board. Other people serving on important City Boards and Commissions receive nothing?FacebookTwitterCopy LinkEmail